macher had conceived it. This speculative school eschewed academic theology's traditional reason for being: the preparation of clergy in service of the church. The final chapter of *Theology and the University* offers a thoughtful discussion of the Basel theologian Karl Rudolf Hagenbach (1801–1874), who not only proposed a "mediating theology" (193) that sought to resolve differences among Christian denominations, rationalists and romantics, and liberals and conservatives, but also prepared the paramount theological encyclopedia of the second half of the nineteenth century, the *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften* (1833–1889). Hagenbach's opus refuted the speculative theologians and bore the mark of Schleiermacher's influence by demanding that theology remain a "critical science" that also prepared clergy for their pastoral vocation. It also served to enshrine the four branches of modern theology—church history, biblical exegesis, dogmatics, and practical theology—and served to introduce theological encyclopedia to students at universities and seminaries across the globe.

Purvis argues that the popularity of theological encyclopedia waned during the colonial era, as Europeans became increasingly aware of the religions of other cultures, and the comparative study of religion began in earnest. "Theology," however it was to be conceived, would now have to look beyond Europe and beyond mere Christianity to define itself. But the influence of theological encyclopedia endured. As theology sought to transform itself into a critical science, it compelled other disciplines—philology, antiquities, and history—to seek a critical foundation as well. As went theology, so went the university. This is what makes *Theology and the University* such an invaluable volume. As an intellectual history of theology, an institutional history of college faculties, and a history of universities and university curricula with a focus on the production and reception of theological encyclopedia, Purvis's book complements other titles that explore the relationships among romanticism, Protestantism, and the nineteenth-century German university. These include Theodore Ziolkowski's pioneering *German Romanticism and Its Institutions* (1990), which clarified the academic and institutional contexts of German romanticism, and Thomas Albert Howard's important volume *Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University* (2006). Perhaps most notably, Purvis shows that in the face of ostensible secularization, in the thrall of "cultural Protestantism" (163), and subject to culture wars and crises of historicism, Protestant (and Catholic) theologians were in the vanguard of the attempt to reform not only theology, but the university, its curriculum, and its reason for being into a model that we would still recognize today.

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Mischa Suter. *Rechtstrieb: Schulden und Vollstreckung im liberalen Kapitalismus, 1800–1900*. Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2016. Pp. 327. €32.90.

In *Rechtstrieb: Schulden und Vollstreckung im liberalen Kapitalismus, 1800–1900*, Mischa Suter has written a fascinating and broadly important book about a topic that might appear tedious and trivial: the judicial enforcement of debt. Suter weaves together theoretical innovations with detailed studies of individual agency in several cantons of Switzerland during the nineteenth century to make an important contribution to the emerging new history of capitalism. Without citing Karl Polanyi, Suter brings to the fore example after example of the embeddedness of market exchange within a web of social relations and deepens our understanding of the contingency and malleability of the transition to capitalism. "The execution of debts exposes the contradictions of the relations of exchange in liberal capitalism" (9).

The book's title comes from the Swiss colloquial expression used to describe judicial execution (*Zwangsvollstreckung*) against tangible personal property (seizure and sale, usually at auction) to satisfy unsecured debt. Suter contends that the moment when debts become unpayable tells a story of relationships among persons, things, and written legal procedures (bankruptcy transcripts, lien registers, registers of bankrupts): of pawned household objects, pledged crops, dunning notices, guarantees, and protested negotiable instruments. It also tells a story of temporality, for credit imbricates the future, the ability to continue to borrow, while debt focuses on the present, the obligation to pay now when the debt is due (9).

Suter structures his narrative in reverse, beginning at the end of the story with a description of the schematic normativity of the triumph of liberal capitalism through the statutory regulation of debt collection. Chapter 1 thus considers the final federal unification of Swiss law on debt and bankruptcy, adopted in 1889 (after a federal referendum) and effective in 1892, in the *Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs* (Federal Law on Execution for Debt and Bankruptcy). Building upon the introduction of the Commercial Register for merchants in the Debenture Law (*Obligationenrecht*) of 1883, the new Debt and Bankruptcy Law provided for a bankruptcy procedure (*Konkurs*) for merchants and a system of execution or distraint (*Pfändung*) for non-merchants, under which the creditor and only rarely a judicial official liquidated the tangible personal property of the non-merchant to satisfy the outstanding debt (colloquially, *versilbert*, "converted to silver [coin]" [17]). Suter argues that this statute crystallized the process of economic change and "normalized capitalist relations of exchange" (31). But he introduces this climax to argue that the neatly schematized system of the 1892 Debt and Bankruptcy Law elided the complexity of relations between and among humans and things that both preceded and succeeded its adoption.

Chapter 2 moves backward in time to the early nineteenth century to show how apparently premodern informal methods of enforcement of debt, largely self-administered and independent of state intervention, nonetheless through local knowledge and local practice laid the foundation for liberal values and structures. Swiss citizens enjoyed a lively economy of borrowing and lending, of things and of money, which they themselves administered and enforced, informally, without the intervention of judicial officials. But looming behind practices of forbearance

of collection, extension, and tolerance for partial repayment lay the ultimate moral judgment against prodigality and waste, a moral judgment that fell heavily upon the debtor forced to seek bankruptcy protection and liquidation, which resulted in registration as a bankrupt, "social death," and loss of political rights (*Fallitenstand*) (93).

After a thoughtful exploration in chapter 3 of the anthropology of debt, ranging from Ferdinand Tönnies, through Marcel Mauss, to Karl Marx and E. P. Thompson, Suter arrives at three systematic points, all of which are reflected in the act of execution to enforce debts, and which form the foci of his final three chapters: subjectivation (*Subjektivierung*), classification, and the status of persons and things. Chapter 4 analyzes the diary of handloom weaver and popular author Jakob Stutz, the published writings of Gottfried Keller, and the political theory of the communist Wilhelm Weitling for their depictions of the subjectivation of individuals under the pressure of debt. Of particular importance is Suter's reading of Keller's novel cycle *Die Leute von Seldwyla* (1856–1874), depicting civilly dead bankrupts as shadowy figures in limbo within a small-town economy (141), in which insolvency never produces a blank slate but only renews negotiations (171). Chapter 5 dwells at length on the continued moral condemnation of improvident debtors in the bankruptcy records of the canton of Basel, as bankruptcy transcripts formulaically find failures of diligence and of budgetary prudence as justifications for the civil disabilities attached to adjudicated bankrupts. And contentious gender relations rise to the fore, as husbands blame their wives for improvident household management and wives struggle for priority claims to dower property brought into the marriage (205). Chapter 6 returns to "The Problem of Distraint" and the status of persons and things, grappling with the distraint of the person of the debtor by means of imprisonment for debt.

Rechtstrieb provides a thoughtful and learned exploration of the anthropology of debt, the new history of capitalism, and the centrality of stories and the agency of people in the past to structure their own narratives of their lives. It is deeply embedded in the local and temporally particular circumstances of the Swiss cantons studied, yet unearths truths that advance our understanding of liberal capitalism more generally. It shows how "liberalism emerged as a form of rule that built upon early modern and agrarian modalities" (282). Erudite and sensitive, gracefully written, and thoughtful, it warrants translation into English to expand the audience who can benefit from its wisdom.

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Elizabeth S. Goodstein. *Georg Simmel and the Disciplinary Imaginary*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2017. Pp. viii, 369. Cloth $90.00, paper $29.95, e-book $29.95.

What is the worst fate that can befall a famous intellectual—to be forgotten by posterity, or to be celebrated but misunderstood? According to Elizabeth S. Goodstein in *Georg Simmel and the Disciplinary Imaginary*, the German philosopher Georg Simmel has suffered a double indignity. Once hailed for his pioneering efforts to define sociology as the study of associational forms, Simmel was canonized by social scientists who expressed little understanding of his philosophical sensibility; his ideas were "absorbed and transformed in ways that not only rendered their origins illegible but also squandered their full theoretical and practical potential for reflection on modern life" (8). The structuralist varieties of sociology that dominated the discipline after the Second World War were eager to appropriate his ideas and anthologize his writings, but they proved unable to fully assimilate him into their research programs. As a consequence, Simmel has become a "shadowy presence" (296) who haunts the pages of course syllabi and textbooks, a "(mostly forgotten) founding father of sociology" (4). His magnum opus, *The Philosophy of Money* (1900), remains "the most important mostly unread theoretical work of the twentieth century" (145). His fate has been to be both forgotten and misunderstood by the few who think they remember him.

Against these tendencies at work in Simmel's reception history, Goodstein seeks to recontextualize him in the cultural currents of late-nineteenth-century Europe, and to understand his significance as a "modernist philosopher" (3) as well as a sociologist. What some have dismissed as Simmel's fragmentary, essayistic, or unsystematic style signifies for Goodstein not an impediment to scientific thinking, but rather an innovative philosophical mode of comprehending the world in the absence of transcendental foundations for judgment. "Simmel's modernist approach to philosophizing in and through multiple, diverse phenomenal series was an attempt to think (and performatively to reflect for his hearers and readers) the ways meaning and value find expression in a world where the absence of stable foundations has become manifest in everyday life" (202). His twentieth-century eclipse, Goodstein argues, is symptomatic of a broader debility that afflicts the modern social sciences, an inability to acknowledge "the links between 'social scientific' and 'humanistic' understanding of culture" (131). By attending to the philosophical impulses that lay in "the fin de siècle origins of modern social thought" (3), before it differentiated into a plethora of specialized disciplinary clusters, Goodstein thinks we might find a way to reconnect the diverse approaches to knowledge that are vital for understanding the modern world.

Georg Simmel and the Disciplinary Imaginary makes a convincing case that we must take the philosophical import of Simmel's "sociological" texts seriously. It draws connections between Simmel's thought and the legacy of Hegel and Nietzsche, and reconstructs the motives that lay behind Simmel's shifts in allegiance between philosophy and sociology. The sections on Simmel's reception by German contemporaries and early-twentieth-century American sociologists are particularly informative. However, for a book that regards Simmel's style as constitutive of his philosophical substance, it is surprising that so much effort is directed toward analyzing his prefatory or programmatic statements—such as "Fragment einer Ein-